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The psychology of reasoning and decision making (RDM) shares the methodology of
cognitive psychology in that researchers assume that participants are doing their best
to solve the problems according to the instruction. Unlike other cognitive researchers,
however, they often view erroneous answers evidence of irrationality rather than limited
efﬁciency in the cognitive systems studied. Philosophers and psychologists also talk of
people being irrational in a special sense that does not apply to other animals, who are
seen as having no choice in their own behavior. I argue here that (a) RDM is no different
fromother ﬁelds of cognitive psychology and should be subject to the same kind of scientiﬁc
inferences, and (b) the special human sense of irrationality derives from folk psychology and
the illusory belief that there are conscious people in charge of their minds and decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Two ﬁelds stand out as different within cognitive psychology.
These are the study of reasoning, especially deductive reason-
ing and statistical inference, and the more broadly deﬁned ﬁeld
of decision making. For simplicity I label these topics as the
study of reasoning and decision making (RDM). What make
RDM different from all other ﬁelds of cognitive psychology is that
psychologists constantly argued with each other and with philoso-
phers about whether the behavior of their participants is rational
(see Cohen, 1981; Stanovich and West, 2000; Elqayam and Evans,
2011). The question I address here is why? What is so different
about RDM that it attracts the interests of philosophers and com-
pulsively engages experimental psychologists in judgments of how
good or bad is the RDM they observe.
Let us ﬁrst consider the nature of cognitive psychology in gen-
eral. It is branch of cognitive science, concernedwith the empirical
and theoretical study of cognitive processes in humans. It covers
a wide collection of processes connected with perception, atten-
tion, memory, language, and thinking. However, only in the RDM
subset of the psychology of thinking is rationality an issue. For
sure, accuracy measures are used throughout cognitive psychol-
ogy. We can measure whether participants detect faint signals,
make accurate judgments of distances, recall words read to them
correctly and so on. The study of non-veridical functions is also a
part of wider cognitive psychology, for example the study of visual
illusions, memory lapses, and cognitive failures in normal people
as well as various pathological conditions linked to brain damage,
such as aphasia. But in none of these cases are inaccurate responses
regarded as irrational. Visual illusions are attributed to normally
adaptive cognitive mechanisms that can be tricked under special
circumstances; memory errors reﬂect limited capacity systems
and pathological cognition to brain damage or clinical disor-
ders. In no case is the person held responsible and denounced as
irrational1.
1I am not saying that judgmental terms are entirely absent in other ﬁelds of psychol-
ogy, for example with regard to false memories and unfounded beliefs. However, I
Even in the psychology of thinking, the same approach prevails
in many topic areas. For example, when we give people longer
letter strings they increasing fail to ﬁnd anagrams. We do not say
that failing to solve a long anagram problem is irrational; indeed
it would seem quite anomalous to do so. In fact, in the broader
ﬁeld of problem solving generally, despite obvious similarities with
RDM, there is much measurement of error but no debate about
rationality.Wemeasure performance errors to investigate psychol-
ogy mechanisms and their design limitations but not to declare
people irrational as result. But if the psychology of problem solv-
ing needs no rationality debate, why is it that the study of RDM
does?
NORM-REFERENCING IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
A clear correlate of rationality debating within cognitive psychol-
ogy is the prevalence of norm-referencing. In most of cognitive
psychology there is little or no debate about what constitutes an
error. A signal is present or not and hence detected or not by
the participants’ judgment; a word recalled was either present
or absent in the list of words presented to the participant; an
anagram offered either uses the letters presented or it does not.
But the study of RDM is different in this respect. In these ﬁelds,
experimenters need to apply a normative theory in order to decide
whether an error has beenmade. If we divide cognitive psychology
into ﬁelds that are norm-referenced and those that are not, there
is an almost perfect correlation with the presence of rationality
judgments.
It is important to note that normative theories are not psy-
chological theories and that they derive from disciplines outside
of psychology. For example, the dominant theory of rational
decision making was derived from the disciplines of economics
and mathematics (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and
ﬁrst introduced to psychologists by Edwards (1954). Study of
decisions made under uncertainty, and the assessment of risk
believe that reasoning and decision making are the only topics in which rationality
is a central concern.
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became a mainstream topic for psychologists who attempted to
assess conformity to rational principles, as deﬁned by economists
and mathematicians. A spin-off from this was to study peo-
ple’s intuitive grasp of statistical principles derived from the
probability calculus, such as Bayes’ theorem. While early assess-
ment of people’s intuitive statistical abilities were optimistic
(Peterson and Beach, 1967), this soon changed when Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) launched their heuristics and biases program
in early 1970s (for later reports, see Kahneman et al., 1982;
Gilovich et al., 2002).
Wason (1960, 1966, 1968) and Wason and Johnson-Laird
(1972) famously attributed irrationality to his participants based
on their frequent failure to solve his 2-4-6 and selection task
problems (see Evans, 2002, for quoted examples). He described
a veriﬁcation bias, more generally known as conﬁrmation bias,
which he suggested was irrational as it failed to comply with Pop-
per’s strictures for good scientiﬁc thinking. None of this has stood
the test of time as his veriﬁcation bias account has been discred-
ited for both tasks (see Evans, 2007a) and Popper’s philosophy of
science has been strongly challenged by Bayesian critics (Poletiek,
2001; Howson and Urbach, 2006). In a sense, however, that is
beside the point. People were considered irrational because they
appeared to violate a popular normative theory of the time (Pop-
per,1959). Similarly, studies of deductive reasoning from the 1980s
onward have shown people to be illogical (Evans, 2007a; Mank-
telow,2012) but again theuse of standard logic has been challenged
(e.g., Oaksford and Chater, 2007).
It is evident that the need to apply a normative theory creates
problems that are not present in other parts of cognitive psychol-
ogy because we can debate whether such theories are correctly
formulated or appropriately applied. However, it is far from obvi-
ous to me why in itself this should lead to a rationality debate.
Why is a person wrongly identifying a face merely mistaken, while
a person failing to maximize utility or making a logical error irra-
tional? As we have seen, in most parts of cognitive psychology,
evidence of error is not seen as evidence of irrationality. In fact, it
seems quite ludicrous to suggest, for example, that someone falling
prey to a standard visual illusion is being irrational. So there must
be more to this problem than simply the ambiguity involved with
norm referencing.
RATIONALITY AND VOLITION
A pigeon that learns to peck at a key in order to obtain food pellets
can be described as instrumentally rational, that is, acting in such a
way as to achieve its goals. Instrumental rationality is also known
sometimes as personal or individual rationality (Stanovich, 1999).
In fact, the argument can be made that animals are more instru-
mentally rational than humans as deﬁned by performance on
judgment and decision making tasks (Stanovich, 2013). Humans,
with their complex layers of multiple goals and value systems
will not always choose correctly according to the immediate goals
that the psychologists uses to determine rationality. Of course,
we could argue that this is due more to incorrect applications of
norm-referencing than superior rationality of animals.
If we consider animals a littlemore, it becomes clear that there is
a curious lack of complementarity between the terms rational and
irrational. Animals frequently follow instinctive behavior patterns
which conﬂict with their individual interests, exposing themselves
to injury or death in pursuit of the interests of their selﬁsh genes.
More accurately, they follow instructions which helped genes to
replicate in their environment of evolutionary adaptation at some
time in the past. So are animals behaving irrationally when they
act (by genetic compulsion) in ways that violate their interests
as individuals? Surely not, as they have no choice in the matter.
As Stanovich (2011), p.3) puts it: “an animal can be arational,
but only humans can be irrational.” But if they are not irrational
when they act against their interests, in what sense are they ratio-
nal when they act for them? There is some sense of rationality,
applicable to humans, which seems not to apply to non-human
animals.
It seems to me that in this important and distinctly human
sense of the term, rationality is not simply to do with instrumen-
tality; it is to do with choice. I have written elsewhere on the theory
that humans have an old mind, animal like in many ways, com-
bined with a new and distinctively human mind (Evans, 2010, in
press; see also R’eber, 1993; Epstein, 1994; Evans and Over, 1996;
Stanovich, 2004 for examples of many related earlier works along
these lines). The rationality of the old mind is very much like the
rationality of animals. We, like them, learn habits and procedures
from experience that enable us to repeat behaviors rewarded in
the past. This provides us and them with a form of instrumental
rationality. But new mind rationality is not the slave of the past;
as humans we can imagine the futures, conduct thought experi-
ments andmental simulations and choose to act in one way rather
than another. We can also (sometimes) manage to override our
old minds, inhibiting our wishes to smoke cigarettes, join gam-
bling games and other activities which may feel quite compulsive
but conﬂict the goals that are new mind is setting for our futures.
In fact, we are most likely to praise someone as rational when the
new mind overrides in this way and conversely quick to condemn
as irrational, the people who give way to their basic urges. How-
ever, while new mind cognition is volitional that does not mean
that the individual is free to choose actions in all circumstances.
Our behavior is the product of both old and new minds and so
powerful emotions and strong habits may override the choices of
the newmind. It is also a mistake to equate the newmind with the
conscious person (see Evans, 2010, Chap. 7).
Another issue here lies with the general methodology of cog-
nitive psychology. All cognitive experiments study intendedly
rational behavior. It is nothing distinctive toRDMthat participants
are assumed to understand the instructions and be attempting to
comply with them. If they were not bothering, then we could not,
for example, infer that failure to recall a word reﬂected a limi-
tation in memory capacity. What is distinctive to RDM is that
when people fail to ﬁnd the correct answer (according to some
normative theory) they are often deemed to be irrational. But
the method presupposes new mind rationality (compliance with
instructions, making best effort). How can we both presuppose
rationality and then infer irrationality from errors? Researchers in
no other ﬁelds of cognitive psychology do this, inferring instead
cognitive limitations from errors.
There is nothing inherently different about RDM tasks that
justiﬁes this difference. If the assumption of intendedly ratio-
nal behavior is sound for the study of lexical decisions, semantic
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memory and size constancy, then it is also sound for the study of
deductive reasoning, probability judgment and decision making.
If RDM researchers can say that people did not really understand
the instructions or were not doing their best of comply with them,
then why should we assume that they were compliant in studies of
the serial position curve? If – as seems much more likely – RDM
researchers endorse the cognitive method and share its assump-
tions, then on what basis can they equate errors with irrationality?
Is it the underlying cognitive mechanisms that cause irrational
choices, despite the best efforts of the conscious person? But in
what sense can a mechanism be said to be irrational? It can be well
or badly designed, ﬁt for purpose or not but surely it cannot have
rationality.
Stanovich (2011, p. 5) is admirably clear on this point: “. . .
rationality is a personal entity and not a subpersonal one . . . A
memory system in the human brain is not rational or irrational,
it is merely efﬁcient or inefﬁcient,”. So it would seem that ratio-
nality, in this special human sense, is a property of the person.
But who or what exactly is the person? It is clearly not be equated
with organism as a whole, nor with the brain. So my brain can-
not be irrational, and nor can the mind deﬁned as the whole
working of the brain in terms of its cognitive processes. In my
detailed account of the two minds theory, I describe the person
as a construction of the new mind and in many ways an illu-
sory one. The conscious person whom we feel ourselves to be is
subject to illusion of control and intentions that have been cleverly
demonstrated by researchers in social psychology (see Evans, 2010,
Chap. 7).
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND TWO MINDS CONFLICT
I think it is time forme to propose an answer to the puzzle.What is
it about RDM that provokes a rationality debate absent in the rest
of cognitive psychology? I believe the answer lies in folk psychol-
ogy, in the ingrained beliefs that we all hold about the humanmind
and its operation2. Folk psychology embodies what I call the Chief
Executive Model of the mind (Evans, 2010). We think of ourselves
and others as conscious people in charge of our decisions3. To
be sure there are many automated and unconscious mechanisms
responsible for suchmatters as language processing, pattern recog-
nition, memory retrieval etc. But these are merely slave systems
doing our bidding. We, the conscious persons, are still in charge,
still calling the shots. This is a powerful illusion, but an illusion
nonetheless. There is now much accumulated evidence that we
lack knowledge of our mental processes and the reasons under-
lying our decisions, frequently rationalizing or theorizing about
our own behavior (Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson, 2002). The feel-
ing that we are in control and that conscious thought determines
actions is also an illusion (Bargh and Ferguson, 2000; Velmans,
2000; Wegner, 2002).
In two minds theory (Stanovich, 2004; Evans, 2010) conﬂict
can easily arise between the goals that are pursued in the new and
old minds. Moreover, the cognitive mechanisms for pursuit of
2Note that I am not restricting the use of the term“folk psychology” to belief-desire
psychology as is common in the philosophical literature.
3Folk psychology is close to the (largely discredited) interactive dualism of Descartes
on this point. If I am right about this, then he was essentially formalizing intuitions
about conscious minds that we all share.
goals differ radically, with experiential learning dominating the old
mind, and hypothetical thinking the new mind. Two minds con-
ﬂict is the essential cause of the cognitive biases that are observed
in the study of reasoning and decision making. Biases arise from
automated and unconscious mechanisms which divert us from
solution of the tasks set. Frequently, there is a default intuitive
response that leads people into error unless overridden by con-
scious reasoning (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Frederick, 2005;
Evans, 2007b; Stanovich, 2011; Thompson et al., 2011). The abil-
ity to override such defaults is inﬂuenced by a number of factors
including conﬁdence in the original answer, cognitive ability and
thinking dispositions. But in general, when someone fails to reason
correctly according to the instruction it is due to an unconscious
or intuitive inﬂuence of some kind. They are not choosing to get
the answer wrong4.
Outside of the laboratory, the behavior that strikes us as irra-
tional is that in which a person experiences a two minds conﬂict
in which the old mind is winning. For example, the heavily obese,
compulsive gamblers and alcoholics are treated with very little
sympathy in modern society. They are held to be responsible for
their own health or ﬁnancial problems because they could appar-
ently choose to be different. Those of us who are not problem
gamblers, for example, think it quite irrational that people should
continue to bet money on casino games like roulette. The nor-
mative theory agrees, because all betting systems are based on
the fallacious belief that later bets can compensate for earlier ones,
whereas each individual bet has an expected loss (Wagenaar, 1988).
But from a psychological point of view this normative analysis is
not only simplistic but essentially useless in understanding the
causes of problem gambling and how to deal with them. Most
effective in such cases is cognitive-behavioral therapy which is
essentially a two minds treatment (see Evans, 2010, Chap. 8).
CONCLUSIONS
There is nothing wrong with normative theories in themselves,
nor with the tendency to debate which one is appropriate for a
particular task. It is useful to have a measurement of error in
RDM for the same reason as in other ﬁelds of cognitive psychol-
ogy. If our decisions are suboptimal, for example, we can ask
what limitations of our cognitive mechanisms are responsible. Is
it a capacity limitation, or lack of experience or relevant learn-
ing? I have no problem, for example, agreeing that neglecting base
rates in Bayesian inference is an error (Barbey and Sloman, 2007).
I do have great difﬁculty in seeing it as evidence for irrational-
ity, however. If people have not studied statistics, do not know
the equation of Bayes’ theorem and are not able to do com-
plicated calculations in their heads, it is not surprising they
make errors. But why is this irrational? As Elqayam and Evans
(2011) point out, it as though learning has been excluded from
the equation. We must apparently be able to reason well with-
out relevant training and learning in order to be judged as
rational.
4Stanovich’s (2011) analysis implies that the choice lieswithin the“rational”thinking
dispositions of what he calls the reﬂective mind. My view is that such dispositions
are personality characteristics that are not chosen by the “person”. The fact that, as
he correctly claims, such dispositions can be modiﬁed by education and training is
neither here nor there.
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The problem lies not in the use of normative systems as such
but in equation of conforming to them as an indicator of ratio-
nal thought. Perhaps this practice is inherited from disciplines
like philosophy and economics from which our normative theo-
ries derive. But to me it does not justify the treatment of RDM as
different from any other ﬁeld of cognitive psychology. We are still
studying intendedly rational behavior and if people make errors it
is not because they could have chosen to do otherwise. The belief
that people can be irrational in a special sense that does not apply
to other animals derives, I believe, from an illusion in folk psychol-
ogy that there are somehow conscious persons, distinct from their
minds and brains, who are in control of their behavior. People are
certainly in possession of minds that are limited, inefﬁcient and
not always well adapted to the task at hand. So they are not invari-
ably rational in the way that Panglossian authors (e.g., Cohen,
1981) claim, meaning that people are invariably well adapted and
optimized. But nor can people be irrational either, in the sense
derived from folk psychology.
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